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 Faced with near-unanimous scientific consensus that climate change is being 
accelerated by human activity and no decisive federal policy on the issue, U.S. states 
and municipalities are taking the initiative to mitigate the problem despite the lack of 
economic incentive to do so. Traditional models of state policy adoption indicate that 
states take cues from either the federal government or other states, neglecting the 
potentially significant influence of cities. Augmenting diffusion of innovation theory 
with insights from intergovernmental relations and collaborative government, this 
paper contends that when formulating climate policies without a federal mandate, 
states take cues from their cities. A discrete-time event history model is used to 
investigate these factors, with a dichotomous dependent variable indicating whether or 
not the state has adopted a climate plan. The results indicate that citizen environmental 
ideology is a significant factor in the adoption of state climate plans, but the presence 
of local climate initiatives are not. Although no evidence is found to support the idea 
of local governments as drivers for state-level policy-making, this research indicates 
several potential future research avenues. 
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Introduction 
 
 On Feb. 2, 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
declared that the evidence of a warming trend is "unequivocal," and that human 
activity has "very likely" been the driving force in that change over the last 50 years 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007). All major scientific bodies in the 
United States whose members’ expertise bears directly on the matter have issued 
similar statements (Oreskes 2004). If left unchecked, anthropogenic climate change 
has the potential to threaten weather patterns, water availability, ecosystem functions, 
and human health (Beggs and Bambrick 2005; Haines and Patz 2004; 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007; Landsea 2005).  
 Through the negotiation of international treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol, 
climate change in the United States has emphasized the development of an 
international solution to climate change. Development of a large-scale solution has 
been slow to progress, however, and state and municipalities have initiated their own 
climate mitigation programs that exceed national standards and goals. A growing 
number of large US-based firms, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
universities are launching greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction programs (Koontz et al. 
2004). As a result, the political setting for US national climate policy is changing, 
largely driven by collaborative initiatives stemming from lower levels of government 
(Koontz et al. 2004; Sabatier et al. 2005; Rabe 2004).    
 Although states play a significant role in the interpretation, application, 
enforcement, and regulation of environmental policies, the federal government has 
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largely claimed jurisdiction through a traditional, top-down regulatory approach. 
With respect to climate change, however, the opposite is holding true and state 
governments are actively pursuing solutions to lower greenhouse gas emissions in the 
absence of a federal mandate. In contrast to a model of top down federalism, a 
majority of the states have passed climate change plans despite the lack of federal 
oversight. Studies of state policy-making have traditionally attributed state policy 
adoption to interstate competition (e.g.,Berry and Berry 1990), federal top-down 
pressure (Karch 2007; Allen et al. 2004), or internal characteristics of the states 
(Walker 1969) . However, climate change policies allow researchers to examine 
another possibility: city-to-state, or “bottom-up,” diffusion. This area of research has 
been largely neglected in the literature with the exception of a small number of case 
studies, the majority of which are in the field of education policy (e.g.,Mintrom 
1997). 
 While there is evidence that US policies in health, welfare, and child care 
have reflected bottom-up tendencies (Boeckelman 1992), studies of “bottom-up 
diffusion” have focused on the state-federal relationship. Current studies neglect the 
increasingly significant role that municipal governments may have in influencing 
state-level action to combat climate change (Betsill 2001; Engel 2006; Kousky and 
Schneider 2003; Lindseth 2004; Lutsey and Sperling 2008; Harrison and Sundstrom 
2007). The states, therefore, are at the center of a dichotomy between an inactive 
federal government and highly active municipalities.  
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 Cities have become prominent contributors to the issue of climate change. The 
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) and the US Council 
of Mayors (COM) actively promote city participation in climate policy. Over 1,000 
US cities and counties have signed on to the COM’s Climate Protection Agreement 
(CPA) and ICLEI’s Cities for Climate Protection Plan (CCP). Both plans have a 
similar approach: cities monitor current emissions, enact policies to reach lower target 
emission standards, and monitor progress. These local efforts are highly significant. 
In a recent analysis, Lutsey and Sperling (2008) estimated that, even without federal 
action, the combined effects of state, local and regional programs could lower GHG 
emissions to 2010 levels by 2020.  
 Given that traditional approaches to environmental policy involve either a 
command and control approach from the federal government or the use of market-
based mechanisms, an interesting puzzle arises: why are states taking action without a 
federal mandate or incentives? It is economically not rational for a state to participate 
in a climate protection plan, as the free-rider problem is too large for a sub-national 
unit to overcome (Kousky and Schneider 2003). While popular support exists for the 
development of climate change solutions (Brace et al. 2002; Brechin 2003; Nisbet 
and Myers 2007), popular opinion alone doesn’t fully explain states decision-making 
and why the federal government is allowing them to proceed in areas typically 
reserved for a top-down regulatory approach. 
 Drawing upon theories of diffusion, collaborative government, and 
intergovernmental relations, this study empirically examines which factors prompt 
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state action on climate change, with a particular focus on the impact of local 
government activity on state-level decision-making. Following a discussion on 
existing research on state policy adoption, I present the results of a discrete-time 
event history model for the years 1990, the year prior to the first city adoption of a 
climate plan, to 2007. After a discussion of my findings, I describe the impact the 
results of this study have for understanding the role that local level implementation 
has on state level policy adoptions, an important role often ignored in the literature.   
Background 
Climate Change Policy in the United States 
 
 Out of concern for the global impacts of climate change, the international 
community began negotiating a response, culminating in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. This 
agreement binds most of the world’s industrialized nations to greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reduction targets. Despite the fact that the Kyoto conference was a major 
breakthrough in environmental policy, as it set landmark goals and over a hundred 
countries signed the resulting climate treaty, US involvement in the process was 
minimal (Byrne et al. 2007). Ultimately the US declined to ratify the treaty and is 
therefore not bound by any of the treaty’s GHG reduction requirements (Betsill 2001; 
Byrne et al. 2007).    
 While the debate continues over the appropriate policy solution, GHG 
emissions continue to rise, contributing to an increase in average global surface 
temperature, in turn impacting weather patterns, global ecology, and human health. 
Weather patterns are expected to change significantly in several regions, including an 
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increase in extreme weather events such as droughts and hurricanes (Landsea 2005). 
Birds are migrating earlier, and the geographic range of many species has shifted 
(McCarty 2001). Additionally, the recent global rise in asthma rates could be an early 
health effect of anthropogenic climate change (Beggs and Bambrick 2005).  
 In the absence of a comprehensive national policy, it falls to the states to fill 
the policy vacuum left by the federal government. State and local governments 
directly face and must deal with the problems caused by climate change, such as 
rising sea levels and regional air pollution. Although sub-government involvement in 
climate change policy is not solely in response to federal inaction, the lack of US 
involvement puts special emphasis on the actions of state and local governments to 
address the problem (Byrne et al. 2007; Rabe 2004, 2006). US states have taken steps 
to reduce GHG emissions in varied ways, including cap and trade, mandatory GHG 
reporting, auto emission standards, and investments in alternative fuels (Pew Center 
on Global Climate Change 2009; US Environmental Protection Agency). To date, 24 
states have active climate legislative commissions and executive branch advisory 
groups and 36 states have climate action plans or are in the process of adopting plans 
(Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2009). 
 From an economic perspective, it is not rational for a sub-national level of 
government to take on climate change as an issue because reduction of local 
emissions will not prevent the spread of GHG across political boundaries (Dietz et al. 
2003; Ostrom et al. 1999). Viewed solely in terms of economics, climate change 
appears to be a policy arena well-suited for a traditional top-down regulatory 
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approach, as with other public environmental goods (Dietz et al. 2003; Ostrom et al. 
1999). It is a problem with a non-excludable good that crosses political boundaries (a 
"commons" problem, e.g. Hardin 1968). In addressing the issue, the largest political 
units, typically address environmental issues that are trans-boundary in nature.  
 Despite these issues, climate change is leading to an expansion of the 
responsibilities at sub-national levels of government. The policies are being 
developed and implemented from the “bottom-up” as opposed to the traditional “top-
down” view of federalism. States have long played a role in implementing and 
enforcing federal environmental regulations, but in climate policy, they are clearly 
taking the lead. This represents a divergence from traditional environmental policy, in 
which each city or state is responsible only for problems within its own boundaries 
and the federal government oversees all problems that substantially traverse state and 
local jurisdictions (Scheberle 2004).  
Local Government Initiatives 
 
 Politically, cities can serve an important role in the adoption of national 
policies.  Although they cannot directly affect international treaties, city policies can 
stimulate public debate and discussion, serving “to heighten public awareness about 
the threat of global climate change and shift public opinion in favor of international 
regulations” (Betsill 2001). As in the model of a “laboratory of democracy,” cities 
with successful policies can stand as proof that certain types of programs can be used 
to effectively lower GHG emissions.  
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 Half of the world’s population lives in urban areas and a majority of the 
activities that produce GHG is focused in cities, making local governments the level 
of government closest to the problem (Betsill 2001). Additionally, city governments 
have authority over actions that impact GHG emissions, including land-use planning, 
waste management, transportation and energy usage (Betsill 2001).  Buildings 
(heating, cooling and lighting) and motor vehicles are the two major community 
sources of GHG; therefore, action plans commonly focus on strategies that will 
produce reductions in those sectors. Additionally, public education is an important 
element in most action plans (Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2009).   
  Cities also set emission targets for municipal facilities and operations. Energy-
saving measures not only provide examples for citizens, but can also produce 
substantial energy cost savings. A committee of municipal department heads or a 
combination of municipal employees and interested citizens may develop the plans. 
Experience has shown that successful implementation of the plans requires the 
commitment of city leaders who can inspire sustained, community-wide effort 
(Osofsky and Levit 2008).  
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives 
 
 This research focuses on one of the primary organizations promoting cities 
efforts to reduce GHG: The International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives 
(ICLEI). ICLEI was launched in 1990 as a worldwide association of local 
governments committed to climate protection. ICLEI works to develop a community 
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of worldwide local governments with the goal of improving environmental conditions 
“through cumulative local actions” (ICLEI 2008).  Today, ICLEI is comprised of 
members from over 1000 local governments from around the world. 
 One of the cornerstone projects of ICLEI is its Cities for Climate Protection 
(CCP) campaign. This program was initiated in 1992 with the goal of encouraging 
local governments to implement climate change policies. To join the campaign, a city 
must commit to undertake five milestones: conduct a baseline emissions analysis, 
adopt an emissions reduction target, complete a local action plan to reach that target, 
then implement the plan and monitor and verify results (ICLEI 2008).  To date, 1126 
municipalities around the world have joined the campaign, including 569 from the 
United States.  Additionally, ICLEI reports a 10% annual increase in the rate of city 
participation (ICLEI 2008).  
 The US cities that have signed the ICLEI-CCP greatly vary in population and 
location. Populations range from Point Arena, CA, a small town with 460 people, to 
New York City, with a population of over 8 million. Nearly a third of the signed cities 
have populations of less than 10,000 people, but 10 of the country’s largest cities 
have also signed. Appendix A lists all of the US cities that have signed onto the CCP. 
Other organizations 
 
 In addition to ICLEI, several national non-profits are active in assisting local 
leaders on environmental issues. These groups include the US Council of Mayors, 
Climate Solutions, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Sierra Club, Kyoto 
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USA, the Climate Crisis Coalition, and The Virtual March. The approach for each 
group varies, but all encourage the formation of partnerships between business, 
environmentalists, interest groups and government. Many focus on the formation of 
regional agreements between states. The focus of Kyoto USA is solely on the local 
level, encouraging U.S. cities and their residents to reduce their GHG emissions.  
 The US Council of Mayors, aided by Climate Solutions and the Sierra Club, has 
launched a nationwide challenge to mayors to strive to make GHG reductions that 
meet or exceed Kyoto targets. More than 900 cities have signed on to this challenge, 
ranging in size from North Pole, Alaska, to Los Angeles, California. The organization 
is one of many organizations that have established a partnership with the ICLEI-CCP 
program to set a worldwide goal of a 60% reduction in emissions from 1990 levels by 
2050 (Selin and VanDeveer 2007).  
 The Sierra Club has aided the rapid growth in issue awareness through their 
national “Cool Cities Campaign.” The goal of the campaign is to have every mayor 
sign and implement the US Council of Mayors Climate Protection Agreement 
(MCPA). As part of this campaign, the Sierra Club encourages its members to organize 
and push their city leaders to sign the  MCPA, promoting a bottom-up effect. The 
Club’s website highlights cities that have GHG reduction “success stories” and 
provides links to a “Cool City” contact in every city that has endorsed the agreement.  
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Theoretical Framework 
Diffusion of innovative policies  
 
 Early pioneers outlined basic principles of diffusion of innovative policies 
across state lines. Walker (1969) originated the study of innovations among states.  
He concluded that certain states were more likely to adopt policies first, based on 
internal characteristics.  Gray (1973) disagreed with this and argued that 
innovativeness  “is not a pervasive factor; rather it is issue-and-time specific at best.”  
She postulated that the pattern of adoption will vary, and depending upon the issue at 
hand and the time frame, a state could be either a “leader” or a “laggard.” 
 Recent scholarship has expanded on these ideas. Berry and Berry (1990) 
argued that it is incorrect to view diffusion based solely on internal (e.g., Walker) or 
external (e.g., Gray) characteristics. They also expanded on methodological 
approaches, using an event history analysis to examine the diffusion of state lottery 
adoptions over time. They show event history analysis (a form of pooled cross 
sectional time series analysis) to be a useful tool in explaining the adoption of state 
policies. Mintrom (1997) expanded on Berry and Berry (1990) by incorporating the 
idea of a policy entrepreneur. Controlling for both internal and external 
characteristics, he found that an active policy entrepreneur, someone advocating for 
change, significantly increased the probability of consideration and adoption of 
school choice legislation.  
 Studies of diffusion have widely varied on policy topic, including same sex 
marriage bans (Haider-Markel 2001), abortion (Mooney and Lee 1995), HMO reform 
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(Balla 2001), and anti-smoking policies (Shipan and Volden 2008). In the 
environmental arena, empirical applications include net metering (Stoutenborough 
and Beverlin 2008), clean air regulations (Potoski 2001), and Superfund (Daley and 
Garand 2005).  Although the applications of diffusion of innovation theory are broad, 
the same principles apply: a combination of external factors (such as pressures from 
neighboring states) and internal factors (including state wealth, education level, 
population density) will influence the decision of a state to imitate the policies of their 
neighbors (Walker 1969; Berry and Berry 1999; Berry et al. 2004). This study 
examines two possible avenues of external pressure: bottom-up (pressure from cities 
on the states) and regional (pressure from neighboring states).  
Bottom-Up Diffusion 
 
 Ushered in during the Reagan years, many policymakers believed that the 
federal government became too large and powerful, intruding into affairs better 
handled by states and municipalities. Based on this premise, they argued for a 
reduction in federal aid, the conversion of matching grants to block grants, greater 
flexibility for states in implementing federally funded programs, and a reduction of 
federal mandates. This method of governing is referred to as “devolution,” the 
“devolving” of federal responsibilities to lower levels of government.  
 Critics of devolution argue that leaving environmental policies to the states 
will lead to a “race to the bottom” effect, in which some states will relax their 
environmental standards to avoid losing business to other states that are more 
“business friendly.” The race to the bottom occurs because each state can export the 
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cost of its more lenient clean air standards (more pollution in the air) to states beyond 
its borders, while the economic growth attracted by the lower standards occurs 
exclusively within each state's borders. It is in the best interest of the federal 
government to maintain control over environmental policy not only to avoid potential 
environmental degradation, but also to avoid potential interstate conflict caused by 
the exportation of pollution across state lines (Engel 1997). Under this rationale, 
federal regulation is justified because the national government would set the standard, 
which no state could lower, thus eliminating the race to the bottom.  
 While there is evidence that the level of governance is significant to the 
implementation of successful environmental policy, there is no consensus in the 
literature on whether decentralization leads to a race to the bottom (Fredriksson and 
Millimet 2002; Levinson 1997; List and Gerking 2000). Millimet (2003) asserted that 
devolution led to better environmental regulation than what would have occurred 
under a policy of centralization. Comparing data from before Regan’s policy shift and 
the actual levels that occurred after the policy shift, Millimet (2003) found evidence 
for the opposite effect—a “race to the top”—in pollution control efforts during the 
Reagan administration.  
 In an examination of state clean air standards, Potoski (2001) found similar 
race to the top effects. Despite economic pressure, many states have adopted 
standards that exceed EPA requirements. A multi-variate analysis showed that these 
states have stronger pro-environmental political climates, indicating that the 
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environmental policies were set in response to citizen demands, rather than in 
deference to economic pressure. 
 While intergovernmental management studies often focus on federal-state 
relations, there are other avenues to explore. In the only study to date of policy 
diffusion from the local to state level, Shipan and Volden (2006) posit that with 
cooperation and idea exchange, state-level lawmakers may view cities as laboratories 
of democracy in a manner similar to the way in which the federal government utilize 
the states. State leaders may allow the cities to try different forms of regulation while 
they watch and learn. Cities with successful policies stand as proof that regulations 
can be used to effectively lower GHG emissions. These findings, combined with 
intergovernmental cooperation models, lead me to my primary hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Bottom-up diffusion: States with higher city 
participation in CCP will be more likely to adopt a statewide climate 
action plan.  
 
Using city participation in ICLEI CCP as a representative of local initiatives, I predict 
that states with higher levels of participation in CCP will be more likely to adopt a 
statewide climate action plan, as city initiatives encourage the development of 
statewide climate policies. 
 There is a possibility that state/local relationships may be antagonistic, rather 
than supportive. In the post-1970’s era of federal decentralization, cities have become 
more dependent than ever on states for funding for key projects, leading to hostile 
relationships between the largest cities and their states (Weir 1996; Weir et al. 2005). 
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This “fiscal centralization” is leading to tension between the largest cities, who feel 
they should have more say in state affairs, and the states. This could potentially lead 
to a “standoff” situation, in which a state will purposefully avoid adoption of policies 
similar to their cities. Regarding climate change plans, however, this does not seem to 
be the case, as cities with noted antagonistic state relationships are in states that have 
adopted climate plans (Chicago, for example).  
Regional Effects 
 
 It is, however, possible that factors other than pressure from cities are 
influencing the development of state climate policies. Diffusion of innovative policy 
literature points to two additional possible explanations of state policy adoption: 
pressures from neighboring states, and pressure from internal determinants (Walker 
1969; Berry and Berry 1999; Berry et al. 2004). Regional diffusion occurs when 
states face similar problems as their neighbors and are therefore benefit from similar 
solutions. Under this model, states with neighbors who have adopted a climate change 
plan will be more likely to adopt a similar statewide plan. This occurs for three 
primary reasons: a) states are in competition with one another b) states learn about 
policies from their neighbors, and c) state leaders face political pressure from their 
constituents to adopt policies that have been implemented in other states. States tend 
to face similar problems as their neighbors and are therefore likely to benefit from 
similar solutions.  
 Regarding climate change, the regional diffusion model holds true. Large-
scale physical effects of climate change, including “bad” air and increased flooding 
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are shared regionally. The smog in New York City can be correlated with increased 
asthma rates in Connecticut as well as New York, and thus both states have reason to 
adopt similar policies for cleaner air. Likewise, weather changes causing flooding in 
the Midwest affects all states in the region, leading to similar policy solutions. I 
expect, therefore, to find clustering patterns of climate plan adoption, indicating that 
states are addressing these problems in a manner similar to their neighbors.   
Hypothesis 2: Regional diffusion: States with neighbors who have 
adopted a climate change plan will be more likely to adopt a similar 
statewide plan.  
Internal Determinants 
 
 Internal determinants must be considered along with regional diffusion effects 
when attempting to describe state policy adoption (Berry and Berry 1990). While it is 
unrealistic to assume a state will be ignorant of the policies of their neighbors, it is 
equally as unlikely that state leaders would willfully ignore the conditions of their 
own state (Berry and Berry 1990). If a state does not have the resources to implement 
a policy, it is much less likely to pass such a bill, regardless of the policies of its 
neighbors. Therefore, a complete model of state policy diffusion must consider both 
internal factors and neighbor effects on diffusion.  
 I will test the effect of four internal state characteristics suggested by the 
literature as potential explanations for the adoption of a state climate policy: citizen 
ideology, united legislature, problem severity, and socioeconomic status.  
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 I expect that a state with a government more liberal leaning constituency (as 
defined by a scale developed by Berry et. al 1998) will support environmental 
regulation, as opposed to free-market solutions to environmental problems (Ringquist 
1993; Berry et al. 1998).  In a related measure, a government united under a 
Democratic legislature and governor should support a statewide command and control 
approach to climate change. This is because the Democratic Party, in general, is more 
likely to view government response and intervention as a viable solution to an 
environmental problem.   
Hypothesis 3: Political ideology: States with more liberal citizenship 
will be more likely to adopt a statewide climate plan. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Legislative control: States with Democratic control of 
the government will be more likely to adopt a statewide climate plan. 
 
  Pro-health interests were shown in Shipan and Volden (2006) to be a 
significant predictor of state adoption of anti-tobacco policies. They explain that 
strong interest group presence utilizes and focuses local examples to build a case for a 
statewide policy that would not have the opportunity to come together absent a 
motivated group or policy entrepreneur.  
Hypothesis 5: Organized interests: States facing stronger pressure 
from organized interests will be more likely to adopt a statewide 
climate plan.  
 
States that are more strongly impacted by climate change should feel stronger 
pressure to adopt measures to reduce GHG emissions than states that are less affected. 
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Coastal states, for example, face a higher risk of being affected by rising sea levels 
caused by climate change and should therefore be more likely to take initiatives to 
address the problem directly (Lutsey and Sperling 2008; Zahran et al. 2008b; Zahran 
et al. 2008a).   
Hypothesis 6: Problem severity: States with urgent climate-related 
problems will be more likely to adopt a climate policy.  
 
 Adopting any new program is costly; only states with abundant financial 
resources can afford the luxury of being a participant in an experimental policy 
(Lutsey and Sperling 2008). Even with excessive funding, the commitment to strictly 
implement and enforce the policy is necessary for a policy to succeed.   
Hypothesis 7: Socioeconomic status: States with greater financial 




 To test the effects of municipal policies on state climate plan adoption, data 
were collected for each state for the years 1990-2007 and analyzed using a discrete-
time event history analysis. This approach is used to study the modeling of time to 
event data; in this context, policy adoption is considered a “failure” or an "event.” 
This model tests for the effects of both internal and external determinants of policy 
change and has been used in many empirical studies on state-level policy diffusion 
(e.g., Berry and Berry 1990, Mooney and Lee 1995, Mintrom 1997).  
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 The dependent variable of interest is the adoption of a state climate plan. To 
construct the variable for analysis, I collected data from the Environmental Protection 
Agency and the Pew Center on Global Climate Change. Many states have completed 
or are in the process of revising or developing a comprehensive climate action plan 
that details the actions that the state can take to reduce their GHG emissions. The 
dependent variable is coded as a 0 if a state does not have a plan that year. Once a 
state has passed a climate plan, the dependent variable is coded 1. The state is 
dropped out of the model once it adopts a plan and is no longer “at risk” of adoption. 
The resulting dataset was analyzed using a maximum likelihood logit model. 
Variance inflation factors were calculated as a test for collinearity. Table 1 shows, by 
year, the states that have adopted a climate plan.  
 
Table 1. State Climate Plan Adoption by Year 
 
State Year adopted  State Year adopted 
Alabama 1997  Montana 1999 
Arizona 2006  North Carolina 2000 
California 2006  New Hampshire 2001 
Colorado 1998  New Jersey 1999 
Connecticut 2005  New Mexico 2002 
Delaware 2000  New York 2003 
Florida 2006  Nevada 2007 
Hawaii 1998  Oregon 2004 
Iowa 1996  Rhode Island 2002 
Illinois 1994  South Carolina 2007 
Kentucky 1998  Tennessee 1999 
Maine 2000  Utah 2000 
Massachusetts 2004  Vermont 1998 
Maryland 2004  Washington 1996 
Minnesota 2003  Wisconsin 1998 
Missouri 2002    
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Independent Variables 
 
 The independent variables in this model are described below and listed in 
tables 2 and 3.  
Bottom-Up and Regional Diffusion 
 
 As shown in Shipan and Volden (2006) states can take policy cues from their 
cities. The key variable of interest in this study is a measure of the percentage of state 
population covered by the ICLEI-CCP agreement. I calculated the proportion of each 
state’s population that was covered by a climate plan using a database of city 
membership in the ICLEI-CCP agreement with city-level population data. For each 
year, I summed the population of those cities covered by the CCP agreement and 
divided this value by the state’s total population. This is the method Shipan and 
Volden (2006) used to calculate their variable of interest. Using a proportion of state 
population covered by policy restriction is preferable to a raw count of the number of 
cities in a state with restrictions, as the size of cities in the CCP program varies from 
small towns with under 1000 citizens to large cities such as New York and Chicago. 
By making the measure a proportion of total state population, I can account for 
variance in city size and with a percentage I can compare across states1.  
 Aside from local-to-state diffusion, I control for effect of neighboring states. 
To assess this effect, I include a measure of the proportion of states with climate plans 
by EPA region. Admittedly, this is a blunt measure of regional diffusion, but it is a 
                                                
1I did run a model with raw counts, but did not find it to have a significant effect on state 
adoption.  
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reasonable proxy for neighbor effects. EPA regional offices are in constant contact 
with state offices over a variety of environmental issues. Despite the fact that climate 
plans are not federally mandated, EPA regions offer a forum for the exchange of 
ideas on all environmental problems including clean air and water, which are strongly 
linked to the issue of climate change. Moreover, Stoutenborough and Beverlin (2008) 
showed EPA region to be an influential factor in the adoption of state net metering 
policies, an policy area closely related to the issue of climate change.  
 Recent studies of diffusion show the importance of accounting for time 
dependence when using discrete-time event history analysis (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 1997; Buckley and Westerland 2004). To account for time, I include an 
independent variable that counts the years from 1990 until policy adoption. 
Internal Determinants 
 
 Diffusion of innovation theory indicates that state policy outcomes may be 
affected by conditions internal to the state, and therefore they must be accounted for 
in a model of state policy adoption. I specifically focus on several categories of 
internal characteristics: organized interests, problem severity, socioeconomic status, 
and political characteristics.  
Organized Interests 
 
 Pressure from organized interests on state government has long been thought 
to influence state policymaking. In this study, I account for environmental group 
pressure with a per capita measure of Sierra Club membership. In general, 
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environmental groups lobby for and support strict environmental standards. The 
Sierra Club, in particular, has been a consistent supporter of strict regulation of 
GHGs. Its current top six policy goals are all related to the mitigation of climate 
change (Sierra Club 2009). Additionally, it has developed a Climate Recovery 
Agenda--a set of initiatives “that will help cut carbon emissions 80% by 2050, reduce 
our dependence on foreign oil, create a clean energy economy and protect our natural 
heritage, communities and country from the consequences of global warming” (Sierra 
Club 2009).  
 It is important to account for pressure in opposition to climate plan adoption. 
An ideal measure would be a per capita membership count of an organization 
opposed to climate regulation. In the absence of this data, I use a proxy for business 
interest pressure on legislators to oppose climate plans: the amount of tax dollars 
generated by the sale of gasoline within a state. Using information from the 
Department of Energy, I multiplied the per capita average yearly sales of gasoline 
(measured in thousands of gallons sold per day per person) by the yearly gasoline tax 
for each state2. Revenues generated from fuel taxes are typically used by a state to 
support transportation expenditures, such as highway maintenance (Goldman and 
Wachs 2003). States that generate more revenue from gas taxes should be less likely 
to implement plans that would encourage the limitation of gas use. Additionally, the 
energy interests, representing gasoline manufacturers, should be against legislation 
                                                
2 I ran models with this variable coded as both tax revenue generated and as a raw number 
of the gallons of gas sold per capita. Neither measure was significant. I therefore only use tax 
revenue generated in the final model.  
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that would lower their sales. For all of these reasons, I expect states that sell more 
gasoline per capita to face stronger opposition to climate plan adoption. 
Problem Severity 
  
 Scientific research indicates that the effects of climate change will be felt the 
hardest in coastal states. As global temperature rises, these states will suffer from 
increased damage from flooding generated by rising sea levels and severe storms 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007). Consequently, it follows that 
states on the coast, faced with the potential consequences of climate change, will be 
more invested in finding solutions to the problem such as developing climate plans. I 
account for this in my model through a dichotomous variable coded 0 for inland states 
and a 1 for states with ocean shoreline.  
 To account for problem severity through an economic indicator, I also include 
the millions of dollars of weather-related damage done to property and crops each 
year, normalized by crop total acres of productive cropland. States that incur more 
weather-related damage may be more likely to adopt a climate plan to reduce costs of 
repairing and replacing damaged areas. 
Socioeconomic Status  
 
 I also include in this model a measure of per capita gross state product (GSP). 
A new policy requires a significant amount of resources to implement and enforce. 
Climate policies have the potential to be resource intensive, as they include costs for 
monitoring GHG emissions as well as costs incurred by the policies developed to 
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reduce GHGs. As a result, I predict that states with less financial resources will be 
less likely to adopt a climate plan.  
Political Characteristics 
 
 In this model, I include three measures reflecting state government structure. 
First, a variable is included to measure of unified Democratic control of state 
government. This is coded as a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for states in 
which Democrats control both houses of the legislature and the governorship. A 
government united under Democratic control should be more likely to adopt a state 
climate plan, as Democrats are more likely to accept government intervention as a 
viable solution to environmental problems.  
 Second, I include a score of legislative professionalism. As developed by 
Squire (1992), professionalism is a combined value related to a state legislature’s 
salary, staff resources, and time in session. Mirroring the findings of Shipan and 
Volden (2006), I expect states with a higher level of professionalism to be more likely 
to adopt innovative policies such as a state climate plan.  
 Finally, I include a dichotomous variable indicating the presence or absence of 
a state ballot initiative. Laws passed by legislatures in states with initiatives more 
closely reflect the state voter’s median views (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004).  
Furthermore, states with initiatives are generally more responsive to public views, 
allowing citizens to “constrain the behavior of elected officials” (Gerber 1996). 
Gerber (1998) described cases in which the threat of an initiative vote led to a 
legislative response. Regarding climate change, a highly contested policy area, I 
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expect this to be the case. States with initiatives will be more likely to adopt a climate 
change plan before the idea is placed on an initiative ballot and legislators lose 
control of framing the issue.   
 A measure of citizen ideology was originally included, as a measure of citizen 
ideology created by Berry et al. (1998). I expect the ideology of state citizenry to 
influence its policies. If a state policy direction is an expression of citizen 
preferences, a state with a highly liberal citizenship will be more likely to adopt a 
climate plan. However, this variable is omitted from the final analysis, as a 
collinearity problem develops when it is in the same model as Sierra Club 
membership (VIF=6.42). A correlation exists between states with high Sierra Club 
membership and those with high liberal ideology scores (pairwise correlation 
score=0.7289, p=0.001).  In this study, Sierra Club membership is utilized both to 
measure environmental support and act an indicator of overall citizen liberalness. 
     
  25 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
 
Variable Mean St. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Bottom-up Diffusion     
Percent of state population covered by CCP 1.967 5.688 0 47.150 
Regional Diffusion     
Percent of states in EPA region with climate 
plans 
15.368 19.815 0 83.333 
 
Problem Severity 
    
Shoreline 0.436 0.496 0 1 
Weather related damage  0.275 2.205 0 38.679 
Organized Interests     
Sierra Club membership  1.709 1.094 0.264 7.973 
Gasoline tax revenue per capita  0.251 0.069 0.052 0.450 
Political Factors     
Unified Democrat 0.207 0.405 0 1 
Legislative professionalism 0.202 0.139 0.034 0.659 
Initiative 0.507 0.500 0 1 
State Resources     
State GSP per capita 29.087 6.876 15.225 49.981 
State Controls     
Percent Bachelors degrees 22.680 5.064 7.500 37.600 
Population density 167.081 226.572 0.965 1082.702 
Maturation Control     
Temporal counter 7.209 4.873 0 17 
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Table 3. Descriptions of Independent Variables  
 
Variable Description 
Bottom-Up Diffusion  
CCP Proportion of state population living in cities that have signed ICLEI CCP. 
Constructed by author based on USEPA website, US Census and data 
provided by ICLEI (Anna Frankel). 
Regional Diffusion 
 
EPA Percentage of states in EPA region that have adopted climate change plans. 
Problem Severity  
Shoreline  Dichotomous variable indicating the presence or absence of ocean shoreline. 
Damage Total amount of storm-related damages to property and crops, in millions of 
dollars, divided by state crop production capacity. From NOAA National 
Weather Service and USDA Census of Agriculture. 
Organized Interests  
Sierra Club  Membership in Sierra Club as a percentage of state population. Provided to 
author by Dorothy Daley. 
Gas tax Total gasoline sales per capita (thousands of gallons sold per day) multiplied 
by state’s gas tax. Constructed with data from Department of Energy and The 
Tax Foundation.  
Political Factors  
Citizen ideology Ideology score for state citizenship. From Berry et al.; available on ICPSR 
website. 
Unified Democrat Dichotomous variable indicating Democratic party control of  all state 
political institutions (governorship, both houses of legislature). Constructed 
by author based on Book of the States, various years. 
Legislative professionalism Measure of professionalism of state legislature. From Squire (1997). Same 
value used for all years. 




GSP State per capita income (millions of dollars). From US Dept. of Commerce 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
State Controls  
Bachelors  Percentage of the population 25 years and over with bachelor’s degree or 
higher. From US Dept. of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis and US 
Census. 
Population density State population per square mile. From US Census. 
Maturation Controls  
Temporal counter Variable that counts the years until policy adoption 
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Results and Discussion 
  
 Over five hundred US cities, representing millions of citizens, are participating 
in the ICLEI CCP program. These cities have committed themselves to lowering 
greenhouse gas emissions and have implemented successful strategies. Due to the 
success and popularity of the city plans, it stands to reason that the states would adopt 
similar measures, using the cities as a “laboratories of democracy” in a relationship 
similar to that between the states and federal government. The results of this analysis, 
however, indicate that citizen pressure is significant, but it does not act through the 
cities, but through the actions of organized interests. These results indicate that state 
climate plan adoption is not related to local government action, but is significantly 
related to Sierra Club membership within the state. The analytical results of the model 
are presented in table 4 and are further discussed below. 
     
  28 
Table 4. Determinants of State Climate Plan Adoption 
 
Variable Coefficient Std Error 
Bottom-Up Diffusion   
Percent of state population covered by CCP 0.038 0.024 
Regional Diffusion   
Percent of states in EPA region with climate plans -0.012 0.014 
Problem Severity   
Shoreline state -0.108 0.539 
Weather related damage -1.543 1.462 
Organized Interests   
Sierra Club membership 0.371* 0.167 
Gasoline tax revenue per capita -0.005 0.049 
Political Factors   
Unified Democrat 0.144 0.564 
Legislative professionalism -1.303 1.641 
Initiative -0.465 0.452 
State Resources   
State GSP per capita -0.005 0.049 
State Controls   
Percent Bachelors degrees 0.042 0.059 
Population density 0.001 0.001 
Maturation    
        Temporal counter 0.218* 0.073 
Constant -6.515* 1.573 
N=716   
Prob χ2  =  0.000   
R2 =  0.159   
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level. 
 
Regional and Bottom-Up Diffusion 
 
 In this analysis, regional pressure does not factor into a state’s decision to adopt 
a climate change plan. This indicates a lack of competition between states to sign 
plans. However, since this analysis does not focus on a specific type of action, only 
the fact that a promise for action was made, this may not be the case if specific types 
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of climate-related actions are examined. The dichotomous variable indicating presence 
or absence of a climate plan may not accurately reflect tendencies for specific policies. 
Perhaps running multiple models for specific types of climate change policies, such as 
whether states are setting performance standards for vehicles (by law, states may 
follow federal emissions standards or the more stringent standards set by California) 
may show regional effects to be significant in pushing certain types of policies over 
others. For example, regional diffusion was shown to be a significant factor in the 
adoption of net-metering policies, which are a proposed solution to combating climate 
change (Stoutenbouough and Beverlin 2008). The PEW Center on Global Climate 
Change lists over 20 policy types that can be used as possible comparisons across 
states. 
 The idea of policies diffusing in a bottom-up pattern is a potential avenue that 
has been overlooked by the literature.  However, as this study shows, the importance 
that diffusion pressure has on policy adoption may be dependent upon the policy 
being debated. Shipan and Volden (2006) found evidence for bottom-up diffusion in 
the adoption of state anti-smoking laws, a highly contested issue with an easily 
definable problem. The laws being passed had penalties for failure to comply. In 
contrast, the climate change plans studied in this research are non-binding agreements 
to address the technically complex issue of climate change. Additionally, in Shipan 
and Volden’s study, the state laws fell into categories that were similar to the local 
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laws they emulated. For example, they examined smoking bans in restaurants, 
smoking bans in public buildings, and restrictions on the size of cigarette packages 
that may be sold. These categories of action were easily comparable across states and 
between the state and local levels. Regarding climate change plans, each state varies 
greatly in the way in which they choose to act, or even if further action will be taken. 
The presence of a climate change plan may not mean the same thing in every state, so 
this study may not be comparing the same units across all states. One possible way 
to address this is to emulate Shipan and Volden and create several models to examine 
multiple policies that fall into easily identifiable categories that can be compared 
across all states and localities.  
Political and Demographic Factors 
 
 Perhaps for a similar reason, in this model the adoption of a state climate change 
plan was not affected by state political (unified Democratic government, legislative 
professionalism, presence of a ballot initiative) and demographic (state GSP, 
education levels, and population density) factors. The plans are a promise that 
something will be done, not a binding agreement on what will be done, and there is no 
cost to signing the agreement, as well as no penalty for failure to act. State resources 
do not have an impact if the state is not actually taking action, as it does not cost 
anything to sign an agreement. Democrat and Republican controlled states were 
equally likely to adopt a plan, indicating that Democratic control of a state does not 
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affect the likelihood of a plan being adopted. An examination of different types of 
actions being taken among states may show different results, as would a study of 
those states that are actively pushing for specific climate change actions. Furthermore, 
the presence of a ballot initiative had no effect on the likelihood of adoption. 
Theoretically, these factors should be important if the policies were highly contested, 
as legislators in states with initiatives would rush to adopt policies that are politically 
beneficial to them, rather than losing control of the issue and allowing a ballot vote.  
Problem Severity 
  
 Neither measure of problem severity is a significant predictor of state action. 
This result is counter-intuitive at first, as it seems logical to expect that states with a 
more pressing issue would be more likely to seek a solution to the problem. However, 
while there is a scientific consensus that climate change is anthropogenic, this fact is 
still being debated in the political arena. Furthermore, the impact of changes in 
climate on weather patterns is still being debated. Given these unknowns, states may 
be reluctant to act on climate change legislation, regardless of the costs to property 
and crops. It may be more politically feasible to spend resources on other, proven, 
solutions such as improving shoreline defenses against flooding and early warning 
systems, than on the potential of climate change prevention.  
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Organized Interests 
 
 The amount of tax dollars generated by the sale of gasoline was not a 
significant predictor, indicating there is not fiscal pressure from against the adoption 
of climate change plans in a state.  
 Of all of the independent variables in this study, only Sierra Club membership 
was significant. This result is consistent with explanations given above for the other 
variables when considering the dependent variable: whether a state has passed a 
climate change plan. These plans are non-binding agreements, and a state can pass a 
plan without penalty for not meeting their set targets. Legislators in states with 
stronger environmental support, measured here by higher percentage of population as 
members of Sierra Club, face more pressure to sign climate change agreements, thus 
appeasing voters at very low costs to their own political agendas.  
 Table 5 reports the predicted probabilities of state climate change plan adoption 
at various values of Sierra Club membership. When all variables are held at their 
means, a state has a less than five percent chance of adopting a climate plan. When 
the percentage state Sierra Club membership increases by one standard deviation (an 
increase of 1.4 percent of the state population), this increases to six percent. When 
Sierra Club membership is at its maximum value (7.9 percent of state population), the 
likelihood of a state adopting a climate plan increases to nearly thirty percent. The 
relationship between Sierra Club membership and state action can further be seen in 
figure 1, which shows the predicted probability of state adoption over a range of 
values for CCP participation.  
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Table 5. Predicted Probabilities of State Adoption  
of a Climate Action Plan 
 
Model Characteristics Predicted Probability of 
Policy Adoption 
All variables at mean (Sierra = 1.752) 0.041 
Percent Sierra Club membership at minimum value 
(0.263) 
0.025 
Percent Sierra Club membership at maximum value 
(7.972) 
0.270 
A one standard deviation increase in Percent Sierra Club 
(2.896) 
0.060 
Two standard deviation increase in Percent Sierra Club 
(4.041) 
0.086 
A one standard deviation loss in Percent Sierra Club 
(0.607) 
0.028 
Sierra Club membership at zero 0.023 
Ten percent Sierra Club membership 0.427 
Fifteen percent Sierra Club membership 0.808 
Twenty percent Sierra Club membership 0.960 
Note: All variables in model are held at their mean value unless otherwise noted. 
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Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities of State Climate Plan Adoption  
Note: All other variables held at their mean value. Dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
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Alternative models  
 
 Given the lack of significant results, I explored alternative model 
specifications: a cross-sectional analysis for the year 2007, and a combination of both 
models through a pooled cross-sectional time series analysis. The results of both 
models are found in the appendix. The cross-sectional analysis supports the results of 
this study, indicating Sierra Club membership as a significant predictor of state action. 
The pooled cross-sectional time series analysis, however, yields conflicting results, 
not noting Sierra Club membership as significant predictor, but indicating that percent 
CCP signatory cities and the absence of a ballot initiative are the factors that influence 
a state’s policy adoption.  
 The conflicting results from these analyses may be due to the nature of climate 
change policy and how it is modeled. In the discrete-time event history and the cross-
sectional analyses, policy adoption is modeled as a static process, once a state adopts 
a policy, it is “locked in” to its decision and do not change. The pooled cross-
sectional time series analysis, however, models adoption as a dynamic process. New 
cities are signing the CCP agreement at a rapid rate. States are continually amending 
their policies, allowing the possibility, if the analysis were extended into future years, 
for a state to revert from a 1 back to a 0 as policymakers reconsider available options. 
Running the data as a pooled cross-sectional time series analysis accounts for the 
possibility of a state reverting, as a state is not dropped out of the model once it 
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adopts a plan. This allows for the fact that policy plans are not absolute and a state 
may change its mind over time.  
 Running an analysis this way for the years 1990-2007 produces results 
contrary to the event history analysis and cross sectional analysis. In this model, CCP 
participation is a significant variable. These results lend support to the idea that, 
regarding climate change policies, bottom-up diffusion is occurring. In this model, as 
theorized, states are taking cues from local governments, placing the states in the 
middle of an inactive federal government and highly active local governments. Given 
this model, an understanding of the conditions under which states follow the lead of 
their cities is dependent upon how the policy is considered. If it is treated as a static 
object that remains unchanged across all time periods, the analysis indicates that 
citizen pressure is the most significant predictor of state action. If, however, the 
policy is treated as a dynamic object that changes over time, the model allows for the 
idea that states are taking cues from their cities.  
Conclusion  
 
  Given the potential importance of local drivers on state policy adoption, the 
results of this study were surprising. Bottom-up diffusion was not a key factor in the 
adoption of state climate plans, but Sierra Club membership was. This result, in 
combination with the fact that none of the state political or demographic factors were 
found to be significant, indicates that states are passing climate change plans in 
deference to the wishes of their citizens. This is perhaps because of the nature of the 
climate change plans. They are non-binding agreements and do not have a penalty for 
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non-attainment of set goals, making it relatively easy to pass a symbolic climate plan 
to appease citizen pressure.  
 Several avenues of future research are suggested by the results presented here. 
I would like to examine which states are more likely to be actively pushing specific 
solutions, rather than signing a broad plan. Examining several specific policies types 
across all states, such as net metering programs, or vehicle emissions standards, can 
do this. A second possibility to compare policies across states is the construction of a 
scale that measures the aggressiveness with which a state is pursuing climate change 
policies. One way to construct this scale would be ranking each state based on how 
many of the 16 “State Best Practices” outlined by the EPA (US Environmental 
Protection Agency 2006).  
 Although not included in this study, a study of individual personal 
characteristics of individual governors may yield interesting results. Clearly, some 
mayors have been more active than others in pursuing citywide initiatives to address 
climate change. The mayor of Chicago, for example, example, in order to encourage 
greener, more energy-efficient buildings, successfully advocated for the city’s 
creation of an expedited building permit process, leading to more than 2 million 
square feet of “green building” (City of Chicago 2009). The presence of an “eco-
friendly” governor acting as a policy entrepreneur may lead a state to be more likely 
to aggressively pursue climate change action.   
 Finally, while the results of the discrete-time event history analysis did not 
show bottom-up diffusion to be a significant predictor, the results of the pooled cross-
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sectional time series analysis indicates a need for more research into the nature of the 
problem. The nature of the policy being considered, whether policy adoption is 
viewed as a static or dynamic process, should be given more consideration.  
 Climate change is among the most serious problems facing the world today. 
Most scientists agree that should the problem remain unchecked, the consequences 
will be wide-reaching and dire. Despite an international call for action on the issue, 
the United States has not announced a policy agenda to address the issue. In this 
policy vacuum, it has fallen to the states to take up the problem and create solutions. 
Although climate change is an active area of policy research, current studies neglect 
the increasingly significant role that municipal governments may have in influencing 
state-level action.  The possibility of bottom-up diffusion has been largely ignored, 
except for a small number of case studies that on the state-national relationship. 
Although it was not discovered to be a driver in this study, future studies should look 
to bottom-up diffusion as a possible explanation for state policy adoption. 
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City Name3 Year Signed 
Prior to 2000 
Berkeley, CA 1991 
Santa Monica, CA 1991 
Muncie, IN 1991 
Newark, NJ 1991 
Olympia, WA 1991 
Miami-Dade County, FL 1991 
Portland, OR 1991 
Denver, CO 1992 
Minneapolis, MN 1992 
Saint Paul, MN 1992 
Austin, TX 1993 
Chicago, IL 1993 
Chula Vista, CA 1994 
Boulder, CO 1995 
Burien, WA 1996 
Atlanta, GA 1996 
Overland Park, KS 1996 
San Francisco, CA 1997 
Aspen, CO 1997 
Burlington, VT 1997 
Cambridge, MA 1999 
New York, NY 1999 
Seattle, WA 1999 
2000 
Boston, MA 2000 
San Diego, CA 2000 
Fort Collins, CO 2000 
2001 
Santa Cruz, CA 2001 
Irvine, CA 2001 
Decatur, GA 2001 
Washtenaw County, MI 2001 
Duluth, MN 2001 
Chapel Hill, NC 2001 
Ann Arbor, MI 2001 
Carrboro, NC 2001 
2002 
                                                
3 Counties listed in this table were not used in final analysis to avoid problems with double-
counting cities. 
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Santa Rosa, CA 2002 
Arlington County, VA 2002 
Brattleboro, VT 2002 
Madison, WI 2002 
2003 
Sonoma City, CA 2003 
Sonoma County, CA 2003 
Rohnert Park, CA 2003 
San Anselmo, CA 2003 
Windsor, CA 2003 
Annapolis, MD 2003 
College Park, MD 2003 
Durham, NC 2003 
Healdsburg, CA 2003 
Orange County, NC 2003 
2004 
Marin County, CA 2004 
2005 
Carbondale, CO 2005 
San Rafael, CA 2005 
Carol Stream, IL 2005 
Fort Wayne, IN 2005 
Medford, MA 2005 
Denton, TX 2005 
San Miguel County, CO 2005 
2006 
Gunnison County, CO 2006 
Saint Louis, MO 2006 
Asheville, NC 2006 
Salt Lake City, UT 2006 
Houston, TX 2006 
Belmar, NJ 2006 
Roseville, MN 2006 
Arcata, CA 2006 
Cloverdale, CA 2006 
Santa Clara County, CA 2006 
Sacramento, CA 2006 
Palo Alto, CA 2006 
Gainesville, FL 2006 
New Orleans, LA 2006 
Belmont, MA 2006 
Reading, MA 2006 
Worcester, MA 2006 
Chevy Chase, MD 2006 
Portland, ME 2006 
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Northfield, MN 2006 
Hamilton, NJ 2006 
Maplewood, NJ 2006 
Albuquerque, NM 2006 
Oneonta, NY 2006 
Saratoga Springs, NY 2006 
Eugene, OR 2006 
San Leandro, CA 2006 
Santa Barbara, CA 2006 
Pittsfield, MA 2006 
King County, WA 2006 
Spokane, WA 2006 
Tacoma, WA 2006 
Alameda, CA 2006 
Emeryville, CA 2006 
Boise, ID 2006 
Charleston, SC 2006 
Dallas, TX 2006 
Milwaukee, WI 2006 
Sarasota County, FL 2006 
Anchorage, AK 2006 
Alameda County, CA 2006 
Albany, CA 2006 
Willits, CA 2006 
Des Moines, IA 2006 
Kansas City, MO 2006 
Providence, RI 2006 
Chattanooga, TN 2006 
Harrisonburg, VA 2006 
Oak Harbor, WA 2006 
Babylon, NY 2006 
Plano, TX 2006 
Montpelier, VT 2006 
Fort Bragg, CA 2006 
Point Arena, CA 2006 
Whatcom County, WA 2006 
Kirkland, WA 2006 
Winchester, MA 2006 
Newburyport, MA 2006 
Roanoke, VA 2006 
Devens, MA 2006 
Columbia, SC 2006 
Jackson, WY 2006 
Pioneer Valley Planning Commission, MA 2006 
Ipswich, MA 2006 
Central Massachusetts Regional Planning Commission 
(RPC) 2006 
Atherton, CA 2006 
Tumwater, WA 2006 
American Canyon, CA 2006 
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2007 
Las Vegas, NV 2007 
Ithaca, NY 2007 
Belfast, ME 2007 
Raleigh, NC 2007 
Greenburgh, NY 2007 
Golden, CO 2007 
Portola Valley, CA 2007 
Saint Helena, CA 2007 
Bozeman, MT 2007 
Larchmont, NY 2007 
San Ramon, CA 2007 
Buncombe County, NC 2007 
Rolling Hills Estates, CA 2007 
Fitchburg, WI 2007 
Antioch, CA 2007 
Novato, CA 2007 
Petaluma, CA 2007 
San Jose, CA 2007 
Fairfax, CA 2007 
Davis, CA 2007 
Oakland, CA 2007 
Stamford, CT 2007 
Weston, CT 2007 
Orange County, FL 2007 
Tampa, FL 2007 
Amherst, MA 2007 
Natick, MA 2007 
Springfield, MA 2007 
Mount Rainier, MD 2007 
Takoma Park, MD 2007 
Missoula, MT 2007 
Keene, NH 2007 
Nashua, NH 2007 
Huntington, NY 2007 
Westchester County, NY 2007 
Ashland, OR 2007 
West Chester, PA 2007 
Pittsburg, CA 2007 
Pleasanton, CA 2007 
Richmond, CA 2007 
Torrance, CA 2007 
Walnut Creek, CA 2007 
Santa Clara, CA 2007 
Miami, FL 2007 
Clearwater, FL 2007 
Hayward, CA 2007 
Martinez, CA 2007 
Mill Valley, CA 2007 
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Key West, FL 2007 
Sarasota, FL 2007 
Newton, MA 2007 
Shutesbury, MA 2007 
Baltimore, MD 2007 
Prince George's County, MD 2007 
Montgomery County, MD 2007 
Virginia, MN 2007 
Fayetteville, AR 2007 
Winston-Salem, NC 2007 
Santa Fe, NM 2007 
Bellingham, WA 2007 
Chico, CA 2007 
Fremont, CA 2007 
Cincinnati, OH 2007 
Cleveland, OH 2007 
Pittsburgh, PA 2007 
Everett, WA 2007 
Northampton, MA 2007 
Phoenix, AZ 2007 
Leon County, FL 2007 
Portsmouth, NH 2007 
Windham, CT 2007 
Tompkins County, NY 2007 
Juneau, AK 2007 
Belvedere, CA 2007 
Benicia, CA 2007 
Contra Costa County, CA 2007 
Danville, CA 2007 
Dublin, CA 2007 
El Cerrito, CA 2007 
Lafayette, CA 2007 
Larkspur, CA 2007 
Menlo Park, CA 2007 
Morgan Hill, CA 2007 
Redondo Beach, CA 2007 
Ross, CA 2007 
Orlando, FL 2007 
Lawrence, KS 2007 
Lexington, MA 2007 
Hyattsville, MD 2007 
Traverse City, MI 2007 
Columbia, MO 2007 
Charlotte, NC 2007 
Charlottesville, VA 2007 
Mercer Island, WA 2007 
Arlington, TX 2007 
Piedmont, CA 2007 
Blacksburg, VA 2007 
Nevada City, CA 2007 
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Hermosa Beach, CA 2007 
Oberlin, OH 2007 
Teton County, WY 2007 
Mendocino County, CA 2007 
Edmonds, WA 2007 
Homer, AK 2007 
Knoxville, TN 2007 
New Castle County, DE 2007 
Bedford, NY 2007 
White Bear Lake, MN 2007 
Ada County, ID 2007 
Lake Oswego, OR 2007 
Manitou Springs, CO 2007 
Nassau County, NY 2007 
Red Hook, NY 2007 
Signal Mountain, TN 2007 
East Lansing, MI 2007 
Clarkstown, NY 2007 
Tukwila, WA 2007 
Kingston, MA 2007 
North Castle, NY 2007 
Haverford, PA 2007 
Arvada, CO 2007 
Ayer, MA 2007 
Waterville, ME 2007 
Kodiak, AK 2007 
La Plata County, CO 2007 
Bellevue, WA 2007 
Millbrae, CA 2007 
Lynnwood, WA 2007 
Lake Forest Park, WA 2007 
Snohomish County, WA 2007 
Decorah, IA 2007 
Norfolk, VA 2007 
Sacramento County, CA 2007 
Moraga, CA 2007 
Shoreline, WA 2007 
West Palm Beach, FL 2007 
Pinole, CA 2007 
Dover, NH 2007 
Pierce County, WA 2007 
Moscow, ID 2007 
Lower Makefield, PA 2007 
Meadowlands Commission, NJ 2007 
Norman, OK 2007 
Brighton, NY 2007 
Park City, UT 2007 
Marathon, FL 2007 
West Sacramento, CA 2007 
Manhattan Beach, CA 2007 
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North Miami, FL 2007 
Athens, OH 2007 
Dubuque, IA 2007 
Yonkers, NY 2007 
Riverside, CA 2007 
Cedar Falls, IA 2007 
Northbrook, IL 2007 
Hillsboro, OR 2007 
Port Townsend, WA 2007 
Sumter, SC 2007 
Jefferson County, WA 2007 
Gaithersburg, MD 2007 
Rockville, MD 2007 
Clallam County, WA 2007 
Roanoke County, VA 2007 
Waltham, MA 2007 
Alliance, OH 2007 
Albemarle County, VA 2007 
Hailey, ID 2007 
Radnor, PA 2007 
West Windsor, NJ 2007 
Nether Providence, PA 2007 
Livermore, CA 2007 
Ferndale, WA 2007 
Elmhurst, IL 2007 
Edina, MN 2007 
San Carlos, CA 2007 
Washougal, WA 2007 
Galloway, NJ 2007 
Issaquah, WA 2007 
Johnson County, IA 2007 
Riverhead, NY 2007 
Lincoln, MA 2007 
Queen Anne's County, MD 2007 
Southwest Region Planning Commission (RPC) 2007 
Warrenton, VA 2007 
Calistoga, CA 2007 
Clinton County, MI 2007 
Rochester, NH 2007 
Albany, NY 2007 
Newark, CA 2007 
Falmouth, ME 2007 
Windsor, CT 2007 
Vancouver, WA 2007 
Humboldt County, CA 2007 





     








Appendix B: Maps 
     
  55 
 





 Completed Plan- 32: AL, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, HI, IA, IL, KY, ME, MD, 
MA, MN, MO, MT, NH, NJ, NM, NV, NY, NC, OR, PA, RI, SC, TN, UT, VT, WA, 
WI 
 Plan In Development- 6: AK, AR, ID, KS, MI, VA 
 





Information current as of August 2008. Figure from USEPA webpage 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/wycd/stateandlocalgov/state_planning.html#four 
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 In a regional agreement- 30:  AZ, CA, CT, DE, DC, IL, IA, IN, KS, ME, MD, 
MA, MI, MN, MO, MT, NE, NH, NJ, NM, NY, ND, OH, OR, RI, SD, UT, VT, WA, 
WI 
 
 No agreement in place- 21: AL, AK, AR, CO, FL, GA, HI, ID, KY, LA, MS, 





Information current as of August 2008. Figure from USEPA webpage 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/wycd/stateandlocalgov/state_planning.html#two 
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Table C1. Determinants of State Climate Plan Adoption  
(Longitudinal time series logistic regression) 
Variable Coefficient Std Error 
Bottom-Up Diffusion   
Percent of state population 
covered by CCP 
0.270* 0.118 
Regional Diffusion   
Percent of states in EPA region 
with climate plans 
-0.032 0.050 
Problem Severity   
Shoreline state -0.769 2.705 
Weather related damage -0.001 0.001 
Organized Interests   
Sierra Club membership 0.673 0.780 
Gasoline tax revenue per capita 14.150 15.049 
Political Factors   
Unified Democrat 0.445 1.485 
Legislative professionalism -1.874 8.636 
Initiative -5.835* 2.430 
State Resources   
State GSP per capita 0.099 0.290 
State Controls   
Percent Bachelors degrees 0.278 0.241 
Population density -0.001 0.006 
Maturation    
        1995 -0.435 3.924 
        1996 5.503 3.650 
        1997 7.213 3.782 
        1998 12.176* 3.866 
        1999 14.999* 4.002 
        2000 18.304* 4.133 
        2001 18.894* 4.100 
        2002 21.276* 4.189 
        2003 22.901* 4.366 
        2004 25.895* 4.271 
        2005 26.918* 4.416 
        2006 29.996* 4.725 
        2007 30.145* 4.668 
Constant -37.337* 8.398 
N=700   
Wald χ2 =  181.74   
Prob χ2  =  0.000   
Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
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Table C2. Determinants of State Climate Plan Adoption 
(Cross-sectional analysis for year 2007) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std Error 
Bottom-Up Diffusion   
Percent of state population covered by CCP 0.097 0.060 
Regional Diffusion   
Percent of states in EPA region with 
climate plans 
0.046 0.031 
Problem Severity   
Shoreline state -0.043 1.044 
Weather related damage -0.000 0.001 
Organized Interests   
Sierra Club membership  1.840* 0.888 
Gasoline tax revenue per capita 2.491 6.400 
Political Factors   
Unified Democrat 0.579 1.271 
Legislative professionalism -5.915 6.206 
Initiative -0.746 0.937 
State Resources   
State GSP per capita -0.085 0.105 
State Controls   
Percent Bachelors degrees -0.134 0.149 
Population density 0.011 0.006 
Constant 0.697 5.882 
N=50   
R2 =0.406   
Prob χ2  =  0.008   
Note: * indicates significance at the 0.05 level. 
 
